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On sitting down to write my contribution to this Colloquy, I found
myself pulled in many directions, as Joan Williams’s new book is rich
with fascinating and provocative ideas. From the incredibly valuable documentation of how rigid masculine norms harm men who want to do
right by their families,1 to the highlighting of deep tensions between
“femmey” and “tomboy” feminists,2 to the courageous exploration of
cultural and political tensions driven by class performance,3 there is
much in Reshaping the Work-Family Debate to discuss.
One of the aspects of the book I deeply admire is Williams’s attempt to spur different groups to make nice—femmes and tomboys,
working-class parents and upper-middle-class progressives. This is driven not by a Pollyannaish desire to see us all get along, but by an acknowledgement of political reality. Without collaboration among these
currently divided groups, the progressive policies that Williams hopes
will improve the lives and chances of many will never gain wide enough
support.
I’m admittedly skeptical about coming together with femmes or
working-class parents, particularly in the context of the work-family debate, because I’m skeptical that we really share enough common ground
to create policies all these groups can get behind.4 But there’s no way
that common ground, if it exists, could ever be discovered without confronting and examining our differences, and Williams is doing just that.
Thus, this book is the only thing I’ve read in the past five years that even
begins to mitigate my skepticism. Unwillingness to confront these differences is a major barrier that Williams is bravely breaking down. With
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1. JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS
MATTER 59 (2010).
2. Id. at 123.
3. Id. at 151–214.
4. See Richard Delgado, Race, Sex, and the Division of Labor: A Comment on Joan Williams’s
Reshaping the Work-Family Debate, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 835, 841–42 (2011).
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that in mind, in this Essay I hope to explore some of my hesitations, in
the hopes of making finding common ground more likely.
Like education, access to a reasonable quality of child rearing can
be valued by almost any social liberal or progressive as necessary for a
healthy society. But I am not sure that social liberals and working-class
people, nor even tomboys and femmes, can come to a broad agreement
over how child rearing should be delivered and paid for.
Williams describes how many working-class people desire their
child care to be performed by family, including tightly knit kin networks,
rather than by professionals.5 They also desire a traditionally gendered
breadwinner–homemaker model, in which one (male) parent performs
wage labor and makes enough money to permit the other (female) parent
to exclusively perform nonwage labor caring for and rearing children,
cooking, cleaning, and the like, with perhaps occasional part-time wage
work.6 It seems to me that this is also a model that many femmes, even
upper-middle-class ones, would like to access, at least temporarily. This
is the fantasy that the “Opt-Out” media narrative plays on and Williams
so expertly deconstructs.7
As Williams explains, few working people can actually access this
model, as not all parents are married, and jobs that actually pay enough
to sustain this model are scarce.8 Almost all working-class parents need
wage work. Unfortunately, those workers, male and female, with childcare responsibilities find it nearly impossible to conform to workplaces
that assume all workers are breadwinners in a two-parent breadwinner–
homemaker model with no child-care responsibilities.
Moreover, Williams describes how this model is dangerous for
even upper-middle-class femmes to follow, as those who stay home to
care for children become economically vulnerable in the long run, unable
to return to the jobs they may have enjoyed before having children because they face discrimination for being mothers (or the type of fathers
who take on significant child-care responsibilities).9
Thus, reducing the economic vulnerability and future workplace
discrimination experienced by both women and men who stay home to
care for children could make this model of child rearing work better.
Workplace flexibility, such as the ability to take days off to care for sick
children or take them to medical appointments, or to refuse overtime
5. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 46–49.
6. Id. at 59.
7. Id. at 20–27. See generally Beth A. Burkstrand-Reid, “Trophy Husbands” and “Opt-Out”
Moms, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 663 (2011); Nancy Levit, Reshaping the Narrative Debate, 34
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 751 (2011).
8. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 59.
9. Id. at 25–26.
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shifts without sufficient notice, could also make this model of child rearing work better for working-class families, who likely cannot afford the
luxury of having even one parent stay at home full time for long periods
of time.
Williams argues that femmes who seek to change the breadwinnermasculine-worker norm could capitalize on the working-class norm of
“family first,” which includes the value of staying close to home and to
family, as well as the value of self-regulation as opposed to selfactualization.10 These feminine feminists could articulate how changing
the breadwinner-masculine-worker norm would help working-class families transmit their values now that the model of one breadwinner and one
homemaker is not feasible for most families.
But is this model a good one? Should we promote and encourage
child rearing provided primarily by parents, and sometimes by tightly
knit kin networks? Williams points out that many elements of workingclass cultural norms—family first, self-regulation, staying close to home,
and rigid, bright-line, often religiously rooted moral rules—are understandable risk-averse choices that create a tight social network and behavioral regulation, which can substitute for the financial safety net that
many upper-middle-class people have been able to create for themselves
and their children.11 But an understandable choice is not necessarily the
best choice.
One might object to any inquiry into whether these choices are the
best or not, preferring to defer to them as private choices.12 But while I
agree that insulting and disrespecting working-class cultural values and
femmes is needless and insensitive,13 it takes more to capitalize on those
values and norms than just adopting a “live and let live” attitude. Remaking the workplace to better fit this model of child rearing in the modern
era does in fact impose a cost in many workplaces. It may be that flexibility makes for more profits in some workplaces, but that can’t be true
all the time.
I think of the Silicon Valley norm of work devotion that Williams
describes.14 There are times when this kind of behavior is silly macho
10. Id. at 184–86.
11. Id. at 169.
12. See Melissa Murray, Marriage Rights and Parental Rights: Parents, the State, and Proposition 8, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 357, 402–03 (2009) (describing and critiquing the myth that “the
relationship between parents and the state [is] either . . . one of antagonistic intrusion and intervention or . . . one of detachment and disinterest. . . . Publicly supported child care, it would seem, is
merely another avenue for allowing the state to intrude upon family privacy and usurp parental authority.”).
13. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 125, 153–54, 212–13.
14. Id. at 83, 90.
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posturing15 or poor management, but there are also times—crisis mode at
a small startup with few employees—when intense long hours are right
for the company. Workflow can be unpredictable, and it may be inefficient for a small company to over-hire in periods of less work simply to
be ready for a crisis mode that will last only one month of the year. Having a small staff that is well-paid and willing to sacrifice if the need arises may be the best way to handle that situation.
When workplace flexibility does impose financial costs, either on
businesses, their workers, or both, is the cost worth it? Every time workers exercise their right to paid leave, costs are imposed on others, either
in the form of increased labor that other workers must perform, or reduced wages in the form of paying for a replacement worker. When
workers exercise their right to refuse an overtime shift or to take unpaid
leave to care for a sick child, the cost is of course much smaller. But
there may still be costs. Another worker may be required to pick up the
overtime shift, for instance, or the business may be small enough that
there isn’t someone suitable to pick up the shift, so the business suffers.
Providing these rights can be understood as fair when all workers
have a relatively equal chance of being able to take advantage of them.
But if these rights pertain only to those workers who conform to traditional gender and family-structure norms—those whose obligations are
to their children and spouses, as opposed to their siblings, grandchildren,
close friends, domestic partners, or some broader group in need—then
we will have transferred wealth from social nonconformists to social
conformists (from tomboys to femmes). If parental and kin-based child
rearing is really the best way to raise kids, then this is the type of tax social liberals should be able to support anyway. But is it the best way?
My hesitations about providing these rights to all workers fall into
two categories. First, in the long run, I’m not sure the working-class cultural norms one might capitalize on to subsidize this form of child rearing are wise. I don’t want to encourage and capitalize on a cultural norm
that is ruinous for those who subscribe to it. The norms Williams describes—staying close to home, self-regulation as opposed to selfactualization, not challenging authority but respecting it, rigid moral
norms—these may seem risk averse in the short run, but in the long run
they may also be a recipe for financial ruin for a family network. As soon
as a recession hits, a suburb or factory town may no longer have enough
jobs, and if an entire extended family lacks the education and broader
social capital to move and find a good job, the results will be grim.

15. See Ann C. McGinley, Work, Caregiving, and Masculinities, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 703,
714–16 (2011).
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The Internet has changed our economy, such that moving and other
forms of major change may be required to get a decent job. Clothes can
be bought online, banking can be done online, and customer service can
be performed over the phone. Self-regulation and valuing familiarity
may, in the long run, lead to poverty due to lack of jobs, just as much as
“hard living” that includes alcoholism and drug abuse does. In the long
run, letting children take the risks entailed in flying away from home and
learning new values and skills, as well as entering into new social networks, may be the better course for working-class families, especially in
light of our changing world.16
Second, we must consider whether these norms are a recipe for lasting, gendered subordination that lingers long after formal equality is
achieved. Just as Williams correctly notes that pandering to racism is
unacceptable,17 pandering to social conservatism is unacceptable to many
feminists as well because they see it as a key component in gendered
subordination. Williams makes a good point that work, not just families,
can be gender factories,18 but we can’t deny that families are a big part of
the problem of boys and girls adopting rigid, imbalanced gender norms.
The model of providing child rearing through kin is one that carries
with it the problem of families reproducing discriminatory prejudices and
norms. When working-class families want child rearing to be provided
by members of a kin network in order to ensure that their values are
transmitted, those values may include things like teaching that “gayism”19 is wrong. Those values may also include conflating being gay or
being a single parent with abusing alcohol and drugs.20 They may even
include teaching girls to make choices that make them economically vulnerable, like being passive and allowing a man to “feel like a man” and
be in charge at home. Of course, upper-middle-class families transmit
these values, too. The point is not that working-class parents are somehow worse parents or more likely to propagate harmful gender norms,
but simply that the traditional child-rearing model, which seeks to maximize parental control over what values are transmitted to children, has
the potential to transmit discriminatory values to which feminists should
not pander.
This latter concern brings me to a skepticism I feel about capitalizing on a set of class culture norms that include rigid gender norms. The
16. For a discussion of how this theme plays out along the rural–urban axis, see Lisa R. Pruitt,
The Geography of the Class Culture Wars, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767 (2011).
17. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 196.
18. Id. at 83–91.
19. Id. at 204.
20. See id.
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working-class families that Williams describes don’t just prefer to keep
child rearing private, they prefer that it be done by mothers, with fathers
taking on a breadwinner role. These families do not seem to be very interested in an equal-care norm where both parents can put family first, in
a balanced way, with both providing financially and providing care. Williams, of course, wants to promote policies that would allow both men
and women to put family first, by, for example, taking care of their children when sick and going to school and sporting events with them. But if
families don’t want that—if they want only one parent in two-parent
households to have that ability—will they really support those policies,
even if they are put in terms of “family first” values? Or will they stick to
the strategy of the “guy unions” Williams describes,21 promoting only
higher wages and benefits in the hopes of achieving the fantasy of a single (male) breadwinner able to provide for his family financially?
How one capitalizes on the family first norm matters, then. I feel
that one must do so in a way that avoids reinforcing and encouraging
gendered subordination and also avoids reinforcing and encouraging a
set of norms that is causing some working-class families to be in increased danger of falling into poverty.
One way of finding that common ground may be universal benefits.
Williams mentions the use of universal benefits as a means to gaining
acceptance of social programs.22 Although universal benefits are more
costly than needs-based benefits, they may at least make some benefits
politically feasible that otherwise would not be. Just as it is easier for
some white working-class people to accept benefits that are not strictly
income-based than needs-based programs targeted at the very poor, I
would suggest that taking a universal approach to workplace benefits
might avoid the pitfalls I describe above.
Just as Williams points out that there is truth to the claim that
people who are poor can end up receiving more public benefits than
working-class people, that working-class people pay taxes that in part go
to paying those benefits, and that some of those poor people bear a portion of responsibility for their poverty,23 there is an analogous claim with
respect to gender or family nonconformity. Nonconformists’ lives are
unaccommodated and are financially and socially disadvantaged. They
also feel, accurately, that those who are conformists are often receiving
all kinds of social, financial, and cultural privilege and advantage. Of
course, many conformists are conformists only because it seems like the
best option in a world of limited choices. But to take from nonconform21. See id. at 210.
22. Id. at 39–40, 199–202.
23. See id. at 199–202.
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ists and give to conformists is painful and feels unfair when so many
conformists already seem to get so much privilege as a result of their position.
A more universal type of benefit would help remake the workplace,
and while it might cost more, it could help get nonconformists and the
social liberals who support them on board with the work-life balance
movement. I can imagine a number of possible benefits: a right to refuse
overtime shifts, not only for child-care reasons, but for any reason; timeoff options that are available whether the person uses that time for family-related reasons or other reasons; or perhaps even prohibition of employment discrimination against those who take time off from wage work
for any reason at all, not just to stay home with kids or parents.
On the other hand, this may simply be too expensive. It may also be
difficult to get those who believe in traditional gendered family structures to support something simultaneously so untargeted and so expensive.
But I don’t mean to be too skeptical. Williams has compellingly
demonstrated how and why the way we expect working people of all
classes to care for children is not functioning. Reading Reshaping the
Work-Family Debate is one of the first times I’ve felt optimistic that the
major challenges in solving this problem can be confronted and explored.
This confrontation is a crucial first step in getting to creative solutions
for these challenges.

